ZP Turkey and the European Union. Is the Cyprus problem as a barrier to entry? Turkey and the European Union." The Cyprus issue as a barrier to entry?
Introduction In this paper we analyze the relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. Just as a possible factor when Cyprus accession negotiations of Turkey into the European Union, its influence in these negotiations and the accession process as a vector in the problem.
Turkey is a NATO member, because its strategic position which made its alliance with the U.S. during the Cold War framing it within the doctrine Truman, as well as OECD, Council of Europe and is an associate member of the EU since 1963, when the partnership agreement with the EEC opened the door to future membership through its Article 28.
We also noted the heavy weight that, since the rebirth of the Turkish state, have had arms forces in making decisions as a result of its foreign policy inquistados problems and their relationship with the Kurds, Armenia and Cyprus.
Turkey's relationship with its neighbor Greece is not just a local conflict but has spread regionally forming a triangle Cyprus - Greece - Turkey based on mutual distrust between these two states. In this sense the relationship of both international actors is full of episodes of threats and securitization and whose main focus, apart from Cyprus, is in the division of sovereignty over the Aegean Sea and the exploitation of gas and other resources that this implies.
In the case of Cyprus, the problem arises from the fact that on this island, located only 64 kilometers from Turkey's Mediterranean coast 800 kilometers which separates the Greek mainland, there is a Turkish population is currently estimated at 200,000 people (50,000 to 100,000 Turkish immigration fruit after the occupation of 1974) (In the House, 33:3)
Due to its strategic location, Cyprus was the target of colonial powers in the eastern Mediterranean. The last of these powers was Britain occupy Cyprus, taking away the sovereignty of the island to the Ottoman Empire. But the Cypriots have always claimed their self-determination or enosis. After World War II and the decolonization wave increased demands.
Before the war between Cypriot and English, the Katak (Party for the protection of the Turkish minority), the first party of the Turkish Cypriot community, founded in 1943, defended the continuation of the status of British colony. The following year he founded the Turkish National Party with inspiration from the Turkish Republic. The demands of self-determination were ignored in 1955 and the Greco Cypriots began a process of independence by force of arms. The British government was not able to stop the Cypriot national liberation movement and began to turn towards the Turkish factor seeking complicity of Ankara. So Turkey's policy on the island step of defending the status quo to a colonial policy based on the search for the partition of the island in terms of ethnicity. Professor Nihad Erim was who established, at the request of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the Turkish policy towards Cyprus presenting a report in November 1956 which included the geographical division of the island with a population transfer. This was the Turkish politics for over twenty years with respect to the island. This is exemplified in some political slogans of the Turkish Cypriot side as "Cyprus is Turkish."
Geopolitically, we note that the state contains variables that play an important role in conditioning and security dynamics in the Turkish case, the state is the product of half will half coercion to adopt European ways by state of these cultures in their attempts to defer the settlement (Buzan and Wæver 20:1, 2005)
Another issue that I will discuss in this essay is the relationship between Turkey and the European Union and the difficult process of accession. The story of this relationship is very old and apparently goes farther than the first partnership between Turkey and the EEC. The intensified discourse on Turkey's application for accession to the EU is affected by the positive decision on the application status of the European Council in Helsinki in 1999 and the opening of negotiations in 2005. Turkey has to face greater uncertainty about the completion of the process than other forms of expansion. We have also noted that Turkey enjoys of 1999 of a customs union with the EU for industrial goods and processed agricultural products.
The negotiations will not necessarily result in access of the candidate country. Unlike previous rounds of enlargement, this is explicitly acknowledged in the text of the negotiations with Turkey, which states that "the shared objective of negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process whose outcome can not be guaranteed in advance. (Harvey, 22: 1)
Another feature of this process is opposed by public opinion in several EU member states and itself Turkey. Linked to this factor is the unfortunate slowness of the reforms in the candidate state, despite the pro-European government of Erdogan and expressed desire to reform by the President. In this direction Turkey is criticized for the relationship between civil and military power, corruption, freedom of worship, freedom of expression, judicial system, the treatment of the Kurdish minority and human rights and its relationship with its neighbors Armenia and Cyprus.
Turkey and its foreign policy: Relations with EU and Greco-Cypriot problem.
To understand Turkish foreign policy must mark the origin in the remaking of the state in 1923 as the modern Turkish Republic was going to the Ottoman Empire, which after centuries with a power suffered a break at the beginning of the century. At this point opens Kemalism as foreign policy doctrine. "Peace at home, peace out" and "Turkey no desire one inch of foreign territory but will not forfeit an inch which makes it" (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Vali 1971: 25,27). the problem is to specify what it occupies. In this regard, Turkey believes justifies his invasion of northern Cyprus as a defense of the interests of its people.
In the world of post Cold War Turkey has been consolidating its new role as a regional power and global player, developing new relationships with Iran, China and Russia, previously under the block were non-existent conflict. In this regard, Turkey has moved away from its traditional U.S. ally, which allowed, among other things, its entry into NATO. And could be seen when in the last years of the Cold War when, after invading the island of Cyprus, the United States broke off relations from 1975 to 1978. In this sense also inaugurated a new relationship with the Middle East and in particular with the rejection of Israeli policy in Gaza ending his dubious position of neutrality.
The Cyprus problem, which emerged following the war that began in 1974, is in the heart of the relationship between Greece and Turkey. The post-colonial Constitution of 1960 emerged from the Zurich and London agreements (1958 and 1959 agreed between Britain, the ancient metropolis, Turkey and Greece is broken with this conflict. But the truth is that this Constitution was born biased due to the maintenance of British influence and the lack of representation of both national groups. In this sense we can say that Cyprus was a state composed of two nationalities and two religions, Orthodox and Muslim.
lived under British colonialism in Cyprus two communities: the Cypriot who was the majority and Turkish Cypriot dating back to the invasion of the island of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire in 1571.
The constitution in particular created a division between Greeks and Turks. Even separate elections were held. So separate municipalities were created in every city and separate elections for elected officials. Designated public office or promotion should be a proportionality of 70/30 and in the case of the armed forces 60/40. The president was appointed Greek and Turkish vice president, each elected by their ethnic community. The Turkish Cypriot community, a minority numerically, also had the right to veto in the field legislature and executive. Thus the Turkish Cypriot vice president could block the decisions taken. Also decisions on taxation or municipal election law requiring separate majorities of the House of Representatives. Greece
support a coup by the Cypriot majority leader and Turkey responded by invading what they considered part of the island for its nationals. This was proclaimed in 1983, the Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by the mother state, as de facto state.
The island was divided by the creation of a demilitarized zone "Green district line" peacekeepers and United Nations. The symbol of this disunity was the partition of the capital Nicosia. After the war, refugee population was changed and there are now thousands of refugees in both areas. In this sense, exiled Cypriot citizens are turning to European and International Justice in order to retrieve the properties occupied by Turkish people during the migration of Turkish citizens moved to the island. With this new population and over the years, the solution has been entangled to the point that this census issue on the agenda of negotiations.
The United Nations has stated in numerous resolutions of both the Assembly General and the Security Council on respect for the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the return of refugees to their homes and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the island. From my standpoint, these resolutions have been consistently ignored by Turkey and the unrecognized Republic of Northern Cyprus.
are currently making processes and negotiations aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem. According to The Economist, this desire has its origin "in an earthquake on both sides in 1999 that caused the mutual assistance and solidarity and a desire to unclog the frozen conflict that has stuck for too long" (The Economist, September 18, 1999:39)
In 2004, a reunification plan by UN was rejected by the Cypriot majority in a referendum while the North accepted the process. The Cypriot President Papadopoulos led a conservative, even by presidential speeches, not a strong pre-referendum campaign. The head of the Orthodox Church, with a strong weight in the country, also came out against this solution. This union was the main cause of the impracticality of this plan. A week after the referendum, Cyprus entered the EU. Its status as a member of the EU is Cyprus main card, making the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus in a zero sum game and producing a rebalancing of this relationship without it was uneven demographic weight, economic or military.
In this sense one could argue that Cyprus can not enter the EU until it had produced a new stage with the problem solved. While it is true that boost the candidacy Greece Cyprus as part of its acceptance to the EU enlargement to the East. In this sense, we see again the triangle Greece-Turkey-Cyprus.
The main difficulty in the negotiations between the two Cypriot government is the state to be established before a hypothetical unification. In this sense, the Cypriots argue, not covered in the North as a state recognition by the international community, a single state. In this regard, the European Union recognizes the entire island, including the occupied part, as the Cypriot state. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots are torn between the creation of two states, an option rejected outright by the other party, and the establishment of autonomy with its own institutions and shares power in the state. The latter seems the only viable solution for both parties and in this sense is currently directed negotiations.
As for Greek-Turkish case are both members of NATO, but the tensions can be traced back to the period post-World War II as the expansionist interests of both states came into conflict over the sovereignty on several Aegean islands. So we can say that this relationship has its own dynamic feature that has been through cooling and voltages depending on the geopolitical model that successive governments have designed.
tinged with nationalist governments and military are often expansive projects and theses sovereigntists maximum and in this direction we can frame the Greek case in the early 70's that sparked one of the warmest periods between the two states. As noted by The Economist (10 Sept 2009) is occurring recent escalation in the harassment air in the Aegean between the air forces of both states. In this sense, I think is officially the Aegean Sea and Turkey Greek sovereignty claim part of it. However, the Turkish air hostilities on islands like Samos, Mykonos or Crete are violations of international law.
Thus we can illustrate this relationship in the Macedonian question. In this case, the Greeks insisted that Macedonia was the name of a Greek region and therefore would not recognize the new state. Turkey was involved in the process of independence when Greece did (Buzan and Wæver, 380:2, 2005) NATO conducted
In September 2009 an attempt to improve the cooperative relationship between the UN and EU based on ending long-standing rivalry between Greece and Turkey. But the latter rejected this attempt because of the blockade Greek Cypriot participation in EU military planning and its application for membership to the European Defence Agency (The Economist, Sep 10, 2009)
The Cyprus problem is also protagonist in the accession talks between Turkey and the EU. For example, the Cypriot government is not recognized by the candidate and the blockade of ports and airports to Cypriot vessels of origin which means a violation of the customs union agreement, are two factors that can freeze accession negotiations.
In this issue we have two positions:
Ankara is adamant that will not compromise to the EU to lift its embargo on the part of the island occupied by Turkey. In turn, Cyprus constantly reminded Ankara that the Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement EC-Turkey to the 10 Member States that joined the EU on May 1, 2004, and Turkey signed in July 2005 to allow start of membership negotiations, is a legal obligation and can not relate to the situation of the Turkish Cypriot community. According to a survey by the Institute of Strategic Ankara, 70% of respondents prefer to suspend the accession negotiations before making concessions on Cyprus. (Chislett 6:6)
Erdogan's government, of a European, is willing to make reforms and economic policies needed to complete the accession process.
Europe and Turkey.
First comes the question: What is Europe? Since the expansion from 2004 to 2007 the debate on Europe's borders. This debate is not only to the extent of shared sovereignty of the Union's institutions but also to the concept of European identity. So a lot of criticism from Europe to Turkey's entry in the argument based on religious identity or even focus on the democratic values \u200b\u200bof this country. So
following Delanty and Rumford, "the Europeanization process that we call can not be reduced to an approach from the state and central government or theories. Emphasis on globalization as the context in which Europeanization is taking place, several European social logic of construction can be identified from collective identities and imagined a new society-state relations and social models "(Delanty / Rumford 2005: 20) . So with
constructivist approach and family, society and European identity can be freed of concepts emerging from the nation-state concept.
Therefore, and according to the argument Fawcett and Hurrell, who argue that regionalism is a feature of the post Cold War period, the new process of European integration should be seen in the new globalized and increasingly interdependent.
Moreover, cultural and religious arguments result of identity debate has made agreements with Turkey have an uneven complexion compared to other states applicants past, as many eastern states. We must remember that economically already in the minimum threshold for entry into the EU, being the fifteenth world economy from the standpoint of GDP. However, in countries with strong Turkish immigration, such as Austria, Germany, Holland or France, anti-Turkish argument is a good argument to win votes.
Therefore, there are public statements of leaders and European political parties to show strong opposition to the accession. The Turks know that European leaders like French President Nicolas Sarkozy think it is time to stop lying to Turkey on its total membership. Turkey is in "Asia Minor" Sarkozy expressed, is not going to be the one to "tell the French school the edges of Europe are extended to Syria and Iraq. " The danger of this rhetoric is clear: Europe doubt the sincerity that turns into a vicious circle virtuous. (Charlemagne, The Economist September 3, 2009). But Sarkozy is not alone, even President Angela Merkel of Germany was raised at a visit to Turkey that the Association is privileged to the CDU advocated and not the status of full member.
From my point of view, the external reluctance of other European countries like France, are based on the weight problem in the distribution of power and that Turkey has a population greater than yours.
On the other hand, rejection of the EU are part of Turkish social sectors. Thus "the secular establishment, a homogeneous group that includes the military, the judiciary, public administration and urban bourgeoisie, is spearheading the anti-European camp. His main argument in the face of public opinion is that EU membership would entail a series of reforms that establish itself as a destabilizing or disruptive to the security and integrity of the state. (Ildefonso González, 126:3) But from my point of view, these sectors represent the old ruling elite privileged from the time of Atatürk and take this speech to lobby in their fight to avoid being replaced other and consequently lose some of its power.
EU-Turkey negotiations.
The negotiating framework between the two sides agreed in October 2005 and can be divided into three main sections:
1.
The first part is divided into 35 chapters on various policy areas of the Union and all laws of the acquis communautaire. This is a global trading subdivided into places where we compare the European with the Turkish laws due to the need of the candidate's alignment with the EU regulatory system. So Turkey must shoulder much of the existing acquis communautaire is little room for negotiation. The process is as follows: Turkey has a document on how to move and deploy the precise point of the acquis communautaire are putting in question and following it is the turn of the Member States to agree a common EU position. At that time begins the negotiation between the parties.
2.
The second open negotiation process are the political principles of Copenhagen and neighborly relations and solution of border problems in Turkey. In this sense includes, in particular the Cyprus problem and the normalization of bilateral relations between the two, which I believe may involve recognition of the Cypriot state. In this regard, Concerns about the principles of Copenhagen is great. One of the main points are the D ° Human and respect for and protection of minorities. Many critics of the membership focus their arguments on this issue. Thus the treatment of Turkey's Kurdish minority is a matter of concern within the EU member states and their public.
3.
The last reference to the dialogue between companies and the capacity of absorption of the EU. In this respect the political dialogue between civil societies and knowledge about the realities of both parties is essential.
Also in the year 2006 the Commission presented a strategy paper on enlargement. And it has been suggested that the criterion of "absorption capacity" as used in the past to determine the ability to accommodate a new member should be renamed to be renamed the criterion of "integration capacity", since both the EU and The candidate must show how the entry of a new member benefit to EU integration. (Chilster 3:5)
Conclusions Currently only one of the thirty-five chapters of the negotiation is complete, five are frozen by the veto of the French government and from December 2006, eight of negotiating chapters for Turkey's accession to the EU are blocked by the absence of open air and sea traffic from Cyprus. Therefore, the solution of the Cyprus problem, based on the recognition of state and / or negotiated solution to the Turkish influence on the northern island, you can unblock the process. In this regard urges a change in Turkish foreign policy, leaving the threat or use of force and harassment on Cyprus and Greece, to create conditions of trust necessary for the association. In this direction the opening of the border with Armenia has been seen from the EU as a first step in this changing relationship with its neighbors.
also the need for a negotiated solution to the Cyprus crisis is more urgent for the Turkish side that the Cyprus and European Union membership. So under these circumstances Turkey and the de facto state of the Republic of Northern Cyprus should not take top positions during this process. On the other hand, a policy marked by a willingness to find a solution must be demanded by the European Union, because it recognizes the northern part of Cyprus occupied since 1974. Faced with the question of whether the Cyprus problem can be a barrier to entry to the European Union consider that there are facts that show it is an important issue for accession. In this sense, Turkey can not join the EU without a settlement on Cyprus and the Republic Greco Cypriot EU membership since 2004 has a veto.
In December 2009, the Cypriot government has shown promising teeth block the opening of five new chapters in Turkish negotiations during the next year. A settlement of the Cyprus problem is essential if Turkey has any hope of progress towards the EU. (The Economist, 10 Dec 2009)
Regarding the Cyprus problem, from my point of view, the post-colonial constitution arising from the Agreements Zurich and London (1959) was one of the causes that made possible the development the conflict. In these agreements the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey were as guarantors of the new constitution of the newly emerged state. The UK played a role in monitoring the agreement, guaranteeing the presence in the island with military bases in the region of Paphos, while Turkey and Greece held the right to protection of the national population in this state. In this sense, the exercise of protection for Turkey in 1974 is correct but the succession war that came with the occupation by Turkish troops from more than 33% of the island and the establishment of military bases, still present in northern Cyprus and direct as part tutejale a Turkish federation from 1974 to 1983, founding the Republic of Northern Cyprus, and indirectly since, is of dubious international legality, or even illegal, as can be gleaned from numerous United Nations declarations and the EU. We must also remember that in 1974 the percentage was 18-20% Turkish Cypriot.
Another cause of the conflict was, in my opinion, the absence of separation between church and state that it occurred with the election of Makarios as President of Cyprus while being head of the Orthodox Church, thus radicalizing question of "Enosis" and the gap between TC and GC. Therefore, the feeling lack of representativity of the first and the desire of union with Greece on the other hand led to tension between them. Must also be added as a factor in radicalizing the military presence in both governments (Turkey and Greece) whose models of peak geopolitical and traditional aggressive military institutions of the two states clashed in their interests on the island.
A hypothetical Turkey also implies a turning point in the political weight distribution of the states and must qualify as sensitive as it requires compliance with strict conditions for the candidate that denote the internal debate that has been experiencing civil society and political parties within the EU member countries. In this sense, the proposed bargaining rigid blocks from European governments make this relationship to be uneven and with a strong influence on future policy reforms undertaken by the Turkish state. In this sense, I think this nomination will have too many barriers in the short and medium term to postpone their admission to the EU this established as an autonomous political institution and political structure will not be influenced by this state that would become the most significant population within the Union.
In my view Turkey's accession to the Union is necessary and can create mutually beneficial effects. For example, from the economic point of view would open a big market for their hypothetical European partners, but can also end the debate of identity that many critics wield bathing in a Christian home nationalism that expose their leaders and showing his true feelings European. In summary might say that I share this reflection: "Turkey needs the EU engagement in order to have a more liberal balance between political religion and secular aspects. In contrast, the EU needs Turkey to redefine its identity in a way to incorporate the Muslims of Europe and to be able to relate in a more constructive relationship with the Islamic world "(Kirisci 2008: 21).
A possible short term solution would be the proposed intermediate steps from the French government, giving Turkey a special status as a partner, not just economically, or creating a new legal concept in the form of a special partnership between EU and Turkey .
In this sense, the flexibility of the EU is about to reinvent itself and create new structures would facilitate the creation of a new concept when it comes to create and process of accession negotiations. Therefore, from In my view the objective of the accession of Turkey needs a road map to long term so familiar progressive political, economic and social parties. Bibliographic
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